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ABSTRACT
China is taking a more active role on the world 
stage, even more so since its rapid and strong 
recovery from the global recession. In the 
ﬁ   nancial realm this expansion is underpinned 
by a strategy to build strong and competitive 
capital markets at home. In order to achieve 
this goal, well-functioning and sound securities 
infrastructures are an important pre-requisite, 
and therefore they receive a lot of attention from 
Chinese policy-makers, as well as from market 
participants both in China and abroad. 
This paper evaluates the current market 
infrastructure, including the legal and regulatory 
framework, for securities trading, clearing and 
settlement in mainland China, and analyses 
the policy-making in this ﬁ  eld. The paper ﬁ  nds 
that, following huge progress in recent years, 
the post-trading processes are increasingly 
safe and efﬁ  cient. It concludes that, given the 
effectiveness of the policy process, Chinese 
clearing and settlement are likely to develop into 
the “modern ﬁ  nancial support systems” which 
the authorities envisage, and which will also be 
increasingly connected and integrated with other 
securities markets of global importance.
Key Words: China, securities market, clearing 
and settlement, market infrastructure, policy-
making
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: E58, G15, G18, G21, G28, P345
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INTRODUCTION 
AND SUMMARY INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Since the ﬁ   nancial crisis of 2008, the global 
importance of emerging markets like China, 
which have become engines of growth, has 
increased. China uses this fact to actively expand 
its ﬁ  nancial and economic inﬂ  uence around the 
globe, be it by promoting the international use 
of the Renminbi (RMB), by increasing China’s 
IMF and World Bank quota and voting rights, 
or by acquiring or trying to acquire strategic 
foreign assets and natural resources. While 
these initiatives are making the headlines, 
what is generally less well known is Beijing’s 
strategy to underpin its global expansion with 
an advanced ﬁ  nancial system and in particular 
effective and efﬁ  cient capital markets at home. 
Such capital markets require well-functioning 
operational support systems like clearing and 
settlement systems, which explains the high 
attention those systems increasingly receive 
from Chinese leaders and policy-makers.
Although mature economies in North America 
and Europe dominate global payments and 
settlement today, China is expected to play 
a major role in the future. One does not need 
a crystal ball to predict that in particular 
securities settlement volumes will grow, mainly 
domestically due to the growing importance of 
capital markets for ﬁ   nancing, but also across 
borders due to the increasing investments of 
Chinese companies abroad and of foreigners 
in China.
Against this background of the inherent growth 
potential of Chinese post-trading and the “larger 
plan” behind its promotion, this Occasional 
Paper aims, on the one hand, at increasing the 
knowledge of securities trading, clearing and 
settlement in mainland China. On the other 
hand, it tries to explore the policy-making 
dimension to better understand the strategic, 
institutional and procedural aspects behind 
market infrastructure development in China.
This endeavour is warranted from two 
perspectives: from a public policy perspective 
because there is a global convergence of 
standards for payment systems and also 
securities settlement systems; and from a private 
sector perspective because global investors 
increasingly seek to participate in the growth 
of Chinese capital markets, of which clearing 
and settlement are important and critical parts. 
At the same time, relatively little information 
on Chinese post-trading is available in Western 
languages, and none is available on the policy-
making aspect. The intention of this paper is to 
ﬁ  ll that gap.
The main ﬁ  ndings of the study are the following: 
The importance and sophistication of Chinese 
securities markets have, despite a lack of 
integration and openness, grown over the last 
twenty years and are expected to grow further. 
An increasingly sound legal infrastructure and 
a comprehensive regulatory structure, with 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) and the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
as the main authorities, have evolved over 
time. The trading layer comprises the stock 
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, as well 
as the interbank bond market. The clearing and 
settlement layer consists of two central securities 
depositories (CSDs) serving the stock exchange 
market and the interbank bond market. The CSD 
for the stock exchanges also acts as a central 
counterparty (CCP), and a separate institution 
has just been set up, which is likely to act as a 
CCP for the interbank bond market. All in all, 
the post-trading infrastructure and processes 
are technically efﬁ   cient and safe, although 
delivery-versus-payment (DVP) settlement is 
not applied to the same degree in the two CSDs.
The PBC and the CSRC are the main 
policy-makers in the post-trading area. 
Policy objectives are investor protection 
as well as safety and efﬁ   ciency, and policy 
implementation seems to be quite effective, 
whether it be in the area of operating, regulating 
or developing the market infrastructure. Due 
to its operational role, the PBC has a certain 
institutional advantage over the CSRC, which 
may explain the different extent of DVP 
implementation in the stock exchange and 
interbank bond markets. In general, the huge 6
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efforts and leadership attention in the ﬁ  eld of 
payment and settlement system development in 
recent years suggest that there is a high degree 
of consensus on its importance and on the 
long-term strategy behind it.
The report is structured as follows: First, 
Part 1 looks into the structure, instruments, 
size and participants of the stock and bond 
markets (Sections 1.1 and 1.2) and describes the 
legal and regulatory framework for securities 
(Section 1.3). Then, Part 2 introduces the two 
Chinese CSDs (Section 2.1) and presents the 
main principles, procedures and risk mitigation 
techniques of their clearing and settlement 
processes (Section 2.2), the history of their 
adoption of DVP settlement (Section 2.3), 
as well as their linkages and international 
activities (Section 2.4). Finally, Part 3 focuses 
on the post-trading policy-making process 
by analysing its objectives (Section 3.1), the 
different roles of the central bank (Section 3.2), 
the aspect of consensus-building (Section 3.3), 
as well as organisational aspects (Section 3.4).7
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I   SECURITIES 
MARKETS IN CHINA 1  SECURITIES MARKETS IN CHINA
China’s securities markets consist of two 
main markets: the stock market and the bond 
market. Their sophistication and importance 
for the economy have increased steadily 
over the last two decades, leading also to the 
gradual development of a comprehensive legal 
and regulatory framework for holding and 
transferring securities.
1.1  THE STOCK MARKET
 STRUCTURE AND INSTRUMENTS 1.1.1 
There are three stock exchanges in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC): the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.1 Unlike the 
latter, the former two are not entirely open to 
foreign investors due to capital account controls 
exercised by the Chinese mainland authorities. 
Apart from stocks and funds, bonds are also 
listed and traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges (see Section 1.2.1 below). 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange are non-proﬁ  t  organisations 
directly administered by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC).2
Currently there are four different types of stock 
issued by Chinese mainland companies, with the 
following characteristics and restrictions:
“A shares” (common shares): listed in    •
Shanghai and Shenzhen, denominated, 
traded and settled in RMB; only domestic 
investors and selected foreign institutional 
investors – under the QFII 3 program 
launched in 2003 – are allowed to trade in 
A shares
“B shares” (special shares): listed in Shanghai    •
and Shenzhen, denominated in RMB and 
traded/settled in USD (Shanghai) or HKD 
(Shenzhen); only foreign (institutional or 
individual) investors, including investors 
from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, can 
trade in B shares
“H shares”: listed on the Hong Kong Stock    •
Exchange, denominated, traded and settled 
in HKD
“N shares”: listed on the New York Stock    •
Exchange, denominated, traded and settled 
in USD
The original reason for the segmentation of the 
Chinese stock market was to protect it against 
high volatility in world markets and control 
of Chinese companies by foreign investors, 
reﬂ  ecting a fear of external dependence visible 
also in other policy areas and rooted in China’s 
history. Nowadays there are plans to eventually 
merge A and B shares in the future, but no exact 
timetable exists.
Many companies ﬂ  oat their shares simultaneously 
on the Hong Kong market and one of the two 
mainland stock exchanges. Price discrepancies 
between the H shares and the A shares of the 
same company are not uncommon. A shares 
generally trade at a premium to H shares due to 
the above-mentioned restrictions on foreigners 
investing in A shares, as well as restrictions on 
mainland Chinese people investing abroad.
The most commonly used indicators to reﬂ  ect 
the market performance of the three stock 
exchanges are the Hang Seng Index in Hong 
Kong, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index 
and the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
Index. The development of the latter since 1991 
is depicted in Chart 1 (in December 2009, 
the index stood at around 3,000).
The Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges were both  1 
founded in 1891, with the ﬁ  rst informal securities exchanges in 
these two ports dating back to as early as 1861. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange was re-established in 1990, when the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange was also set up.
See Section 1.3.1 below. The three mainland Chinese futures  2 
exchanges in Shanghai, Dalian and Zhengzhou, which are also 
regulated by the CSRC, are not covered in this paper.
Qualiﬁ  ed Foreign Institutional Investor 3   – as at May 2010, a total 
of 96 foreign institutional investors had been approved under the 
QFII program (see www.csrc.gov.cn). Quotas under the QFII 
program currently amount to USD 30 billion.8
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1.1.2 MARKET SIZE AND PARTICIPANTS
By end-2008, an accumulated amount of RMB 
333 billion (€35 billion) had been raised in 
the primary market for A shares (new issues), 
decreasing by 57% from 2007 as a result of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis. After the Lehman Brothers collapse 
in September 2008, there was an unofﬁ  cial ban 
on IPOs, which was lifted again in May 2009.
At the end of 2008, 1,625 corporations had 
been listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges, compared with less than 800 in 1997 
and only 53 in 1992.4 The great majority of 
those companies (94%) are listed as A shares, 
which also account for almost 100% of market 
capitalisation and trading turnover in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. The listed companies include 
28  ﬁ   nancial corporations, which at the end 
of 2008 accounted for 33% of the total market 
capitalisation, the highest ratio of all industries. 
As a result of the crisis, Chinese banks now 
hold the top positions as the largest banks in the 
world by market value.
The impact of the global economic crisis also 
affected the secondary market. At year-end 
2008, the market capitalisation of A shares was 
RMB 12 trillion (€1,250 billion), decreasing 
by 63% from 2007. The total trading of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 
2008 amounted to 2.4 trillion shares worth RMB 
26.71 trillion (€2,782 billion). The turnover 
decrease over 2007 was 42%, which however 
followed an increase from RMB 9 trillion 
(in 2006) to RMB 46 trillion (in 2007) caused by 
the equity boom in 2007 that made China’s stock 
market temporarily the world’s second largest 
in terms of turnover after the US. The number 
of investor accounts has constantly grown over 
the last decade and by end-2009 amounted to 
144.3 million accounts in the A share market 
and 2.5 million accounts in the B share market.
1.2  THE BOND MARKET
The bond market in mainland China has a 
multi-layered structure, comprising the interbank 
bond market, the exchange bond market and the 
bank counter market, with the interbank bond 
market being the dominant trading venue.
1.2.1 STRUCTURE AND INSTRUMENTS
INTERBANK BOND MARKET
The interbank bond market is a quote-driven 
OTC market outside the exchanges. It is 
regulated by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
and functions as a wholesale market for 
institutional investors. Deals are struck based on 
bid and ask prices negotiated between two 
trading counterparties. The interbank bond 
market was formed in June 1997 when the PBC, 
under the instruction of the State Council, 
mandated 5 that all commercial banks move their 
repo and bond trading away from the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges and onto an 
interbank market operating through an electronic 
trading system. Banning the banks from 
participating in trading on the exchanges was 
partly motivated by their role in the equity and 
real estate bubbles in the early 1990s, but 
CSRC,  4  China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook 2009 
[for 2008], Shanghai, September 2009, pp. 4-5.
Via the  5  Notice on Cessation of Repo and Bond Trading 
by Commercial Banks in the Stock Exchanges (PBC Notice 
No. (1997) 240). See Mu Huaipeng, “The development of 
China’s bond market”, in: Bank for International Settlements, 
Developing corporate bond markets in Asia (BIS Papers No. 26), 
February 2006, p. 56.
Chart 1 Shanghai (SSE) Composite Index 
from 1991 to the start of 2009































retrieved on 22 December 2009.9
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I   SECURITIES 
MARKETS IN CHINA was mainly aimed at insulating the Chinese 
banking system from market risks associated 
with exchange transactions. Today, more than 
ten years later, the interbank bond market is by 
far the biggest bond market in China, accounting 
for more than 90% of the total custody and 
trading volume. Apart from using the Interbank 
Trading System of the National Interbank Funding 
Center (also known as CFETS), counterparties can 
also negotiate deals directly via bilateral contracts.
Compared with the two other markets, 
participants in the interbank bond market have 
access to a broad array of trading instruments 
like government bonds, central bank bills, 
different types of ﬁ   nancial bonds and non-
ﬁ   nancial corporation bonds, asset-backed 
securities and panda bonds (RMB-denominated 
bonds issued by international development 
institutions).6 The interbank bond market is also 
where the PBC conducts its open market 
operations. The central bank bill, corporate 
commercial paper and the mid-term note, three 
instruments that are solely traded in the interbank 
bond market, are by far the most actively traded 
products in the Chinese bond market.
EXCHANGE BOND MARKET
The exchange bond market is an order-driven 
market, where bonds are traded, alongside 
equities, on an exchange. It is regulated by the 
CSRC. Small and medium-sized institutions 
as well as individuals are the main players in 
this market and usually access it via brokerage 
services provided by the stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen (see Section 1.1.1 
above). Although commercial banks are 
currently still prohibited from trading in the 
exchange bond market, the State Council has 
recently approved a new regime for granting 
qualiﬁ  ed listed commercial banks access to it, 
which is currently in a pilot phase and will, if it 
is successful, be completely implemented. The 
main instruments traded in the exchange bond 
market are government bonds and (lower-rated) 
corporate bonds with medium to long-term 
maturities. Corporate bonds have been boosted 
by the fact that they are usually guaranteed by 
one of the state-owned banks.
BANK COUNTER MARKET
The bank counter market is a retail bond market 
offered by commercial banks. It is regulated by 
the PBC. Targeting mainly individual investors, 
it complements the other two bond markets, 
although the varieties of bond instruments 
available in this market are rather limited, 
with mainly government bonds in the form of 
book-entry bonds and electronic saving bonds 
available. Electronic saving bonds are mainly 
sold at banks. They target individual investors 
and channel household savings directly into 
national construction funds. The issuing process 
is relatively simple. Saving bonds cannot be 
traded, but they can be used as collateral and if 
needed sold back to banks before maturity.
1.2.2 MARKET SIZE AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of 2008, the total amount of 
bonds outstanding was RMB 14.2 trillion 
(€1,479 billion), increasing by 23% from 2007, 
and consisting of RMB 13.9 trillion (97.8%) in 
the interbank bond market, RMB 313 billion 
(€33 billion) in the exchange bond market and 
less than RMB 1 billion in the bank counter 
market. In 2008, the total issuance of all 
kinds of bonds amounted to RMB 7.15 trillion 
(€745 billion), decreasing by 11% from 2007, 
and consisting of RMB 7.07 trillion 
(nearly 99%) in the interbank bond market and 
RMB 79 billion (€8 billion) in the exchange 
bond market.
The single most important bond category is 
central bank bills, the issuance of which has 
grown from RMB 723 billion (€75 billion) 
in 2003 to RMB 4.3 trillion (€448 billion) 
in 2008. They are issued by the PBC to members 
of the interbank bond market, with the majority 
of maturities lying between three months and 
one year. In 2003, short of government bonds 
needed for open market operations, the PBC 
started to issue its own central bank 
So far, three panda bonds have been issued in 2005 and 2006,  6 
two by the International Finance Corporation of the World 
Bank Group and one by the Asian Development Bank, totalling 
RMB 3 billion. For a comprehensive description of the major 
bond instruments, issuers and investors, see Standard & Poor’s, 
An introduction to Chinese bond markets, March 2009, pp. 7-24.10
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“sterilisation” bills to absorb extra market 
liquidity.7 Due to its simplicity and ﬂ  exibility, 
the central bank bill quickly became not only 
the most important monetary tool for open 
market operations in China, but also one of the 
most actively traded instruments and thereby a 
useful benchmark.
As an example of the steady development 
of Chinese bond markets over the last three 
decades, Chart 2 shows the historical issuance of 
government bonds since 1981. The peak in 1998 
was caused by aggressive ﬁ  scal policies in the 
aftermath of the Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis.8
A segment that has received a lot of attention 
from the authorities in recent years – and hence 
also from investors – is the corporate bond market. 
Following the enactment in December 2004 
of administrative rules allowing the circulation 
of corporate bonds in the interbank bond market, 
it has grown considerably and by end-2008 was 
almost as big as the government bond market in 
terms of issuance (RMB 844 billion compared 
with RMB 856 billion).9 However, in terms of 
outstanding bonds, at the end of 2008 corporate 
bonds only accounted for 8.4% of China’s total, 
well below approximately 20% in the US.
The major issuers in the Chinese bond market 
are the central government (mainly the Ministry 
of Finance, and to a lesser extent also the 
Ministry of Railways), the PBC, the three 
policy banks 10 (China Development Bank, 
Export-Import Bank of China, Agricultural 
Development Bank of China), commercial 
banks, the China International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (CITIC) and other 
non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions, as well as listed 
companies and other enterprises.
The major investors are – in order of
importance – commercial banks, insurance 
companies, mutual funds, securities companies, 
the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), 
occupational pension funds, non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, enterprises, QFIIs and individual 
investors. All those have direct access to the 
They are called  7  sterilisation bills because the central bank issues and 
sells these bills to “sterilise” the growth in money supply stemming 
from its foreign exchange interventions to keep the Renminbi 
exchange rate stable (the PBC buying USD against RMB).
See Takeshi Jingu, “China’s Government Bond Market”,  8 
Nomura Capital Market Review Vol. 11 No. 1, 2008, p. 28.
CSRC (2009), p. 7. 9 
Policy banks 10   are owned and backed by the government and 
can issue bonds at much lower cost than commercial banks. 
The funds raised are usually used to ﬁ  nance key national projects 
not covered by the ﬁ  scal budget (supplement of ﬁ  scal funds).
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Source: Standard & Poor’s (2009), exhibit 1, p.4, based on Wind Info data.11
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I   SECURITIES 
MARKETS IN CHINA interbank bond market, except the NSSF, 
occupational pension funds and individual 
investors, which can access it via (qualiﬁ  ed) 
securities  ﬁ   rms acting as fund managers or 
brokers. Commercial banks are the main market 
participants for both primary and secondary 
bond markets.
The number of institutional investors in the 
interbank bond market has risen from 315 at 
the end of 2000 to 9,247 at the end of 2009, 
mainly due to the huge increase in the number 
of enterprises during that period. In the bank 
counter market, which started in 2002 with a 
trial of trading book-entry government bonds 
over the counters of the four big state-owned 
commercial banks (Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China), 
there were nearly 7.6 million investor accounts 
by end-2009.11
1.3  LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
1.3.1 REGULATORY STRUCTURE
China follows a sectoral supervision model for 
its  ﬁ  nancial industry, with banking, insurance 
and securities sectors being under separate 
supervision by the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC), the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC) and the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
respectively.12
The Beijing-based CSRC (in Chinese 
abbreviated as Zhengjianhui  证监会) was 
established in 1992 and is an institution 
with ministerial rank under the State 
Council of the PRC. Its current Chairman 
is Mr SHANG Fulin 尚福林. Since 1999, 
when the PBC was also reorganised in the 
post-Asian  ﬁ  nancial  crisis  ﬁ  nancial  sector 
reforms to increase its ability to implement 
monetary policy, the CSRC has been the 
main securities regulator on the mainland. 
Its functions are similar to the SEC in the US. 
By end-2008, it had 2,512 staff members, 
of which 649 were located in the Beijing 
headquarters and the rest in various regional 
ofﬁ  ces.13 Its statutory regulatory duties and 
measures are set forth in Articles 179 and 180 
of the Securities Law of the People’s Republic 
of China ( ﬁ  rst adopted in 1998) respectively, 
granting the CSRC for example the authority 
“to implement a centralized and uniﬁ  ed 
regulation of the nationwide securities markets 
in order to ensure their lawful operation” and the 
authority “to investigate, and impose penalties 
for, illegal activities related to securities and 
futures”. The policy objectives of the CSRC are 
investor protection as well as safety, efﬁ  ciency 
and the “low cost” of the securities market 
infrastructure. To achieve these objectives, one 
important focus of the regulatory work of the 
CSRC is the management of risks related to 
clearing and settlement, mainly legal, credit, 
operational, technical and liquidity risks.
As mentioned above, the PBC is responsible for 
regulating the interbank bond market and the 
bank counter market. In addition, the Ministry 
of Finance  (MOF) is accountable for the 
management of the primary and secondary 
government bond markets. To supplement 
the regulatory efforts of the CSRC, the PBC 
and the MOF, self-regulatory organisations 
(including the two stock exchanges), 
the Securities Association of China (SAC), 
the China Futures Association (CFA), as well as 
the two CSDs (see Section 2.1 below), conduct 
self-regulation and front-line supervision over 
securities trading and post-trading activities 
of their members, participants or listed 
companies.
The legal basis for the regulatory role of the 
PBC in the ﬁ   eld of securities is included in 
the  Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on the People’s Bank of China. Whereas its 
original version of March 1995 only refers to 
“the supervision and control of the ﬁ  nancial 
For 2009 ﬁ   gures see the monthly statistics at http://www. 11 
chinabond.com.cn/Site/cb/en, retrieved on 14 January 2010.
Like the PBC head ofﬁ  ce, all three Commissions are located in  12 
Beijing Financial Street, an area within the second ring road, 
which is China’s “ﬁ   nancial regulation center” and also called 
China’s Wall Street although it does not include a stock exchange.
CSRC,  13  Annual Report 2008, May 2009, p. 7.12
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market”, the amended version of December 2003 
speciﬁ  es “the regulation and supervision of the 
interbank lending market and the interbank bond 
market” as one of the functions assumed by the 
PBC (Article 4, indent 4). Article 32 stipulates 
further that the PBC may check the compliance 
of  ﬁ   nancial institutions, other institutions 
and individuals with regulatory rules on the 
interbank lending market and the interbank bond 
market. Within the PBC, the Financial Market 
Department (FMD) carries out these regulatory 
tasks (see Section 3.4 below). More speciﬁ  cally, 
the FMD is responsible for drafting regulations 
for the interbank lending market and the 
interbank bond market, granting access to those 
two markets, analysing the impact of market 
instruments on monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial 
stability, guiding the National Interbank Funding 
Center (main trading venue; see Section 1.2.1 
above) and the CDC (the CSD for the interbank 
bond market), monitoring market activities and 
risks, as well as fostering product innovation and 
“an orderly market development”. In addition, 
the PBC oversees securities settlement systems 
(see Section 3.2 below).
1.3.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The safety of trading, clearing and settlement 
depends on the soundness of the legal 
infrastructure on which they are built. In China, 
as in other countries, the legal provisions for 
holding and transferring securities have followed 
the progress of capital markets, becoming more 
complex and sophisticated over time. This can be 
illustrated by the fact that the 1998 version of the 
Securities Law, the nation’s ﬁ  rst comprehensive 
securities legislation, contained nothing on 
clearing and settlement, while clearing and 
settlement were widely covered in the 2005 
revision of the law.14 This revision took the 
experience gathered during the preceding eight 
years into account and is generally regarded as a 
big step forward in achieving legal certainty in 
this ﬁ  eld. As a result of the “great importance 
attached by China to the construction of market 
infrastructures, especially the development of 
a sound underlying statutory framework”,15 
in recent years a comprehensive legal framework 
for ﬁ  nancial instruments has evolved.
Today, a hierarchical legal system exists, 
which consists of three tiers of provisions with 
a decreasing level of legal authority and an 
increasing level of detail: the foundation and ﬁ  rst 
tier are state laws set by the National People’s 
Congress, the Chinese legislative body, like the 
Securities Law, the Company Law, the Fund Law 
and other relevant laws. The second tier is made 
up of regulations laid down by the responsible 
regulator (see Section 1.3.1), for example the 
CSRC’s  Measures for the Administration of 
Securities Registration and Settlement (hereafter 
called “Measures”), the PBC’s Regulations on 
Trading in the Interbank Bond Market, or the 
MOF’s Temporary Provisions on Managing 
the Custody of Government Bonds. The third 
tier consists of the rules and procedures of the 
two Chinese CSDs, like those on accounting, 
registration, custody, settlement, and general 
or speciﬁ   c (e.g. for repo transactions) master 
agreements for signature by their participants.
For example, with regard to the management 
of securities accounts, the different provisions 
stipulate that:
investors must hold securities through    •
securities accounts, which are used to record 
the balances and changes of their securities 
positions;16
the    • real name system ensuring that securities 
are held under the real name of the account 
owner has to be applied (Articles 80, 166 and 
168 of the Securities Law, Articles 19-20 
of the Measures); and
it is the responsibility of the CSDs and    •
securities companies to perform anti-money 
laundering checks when investors open and 
use securities accounts. It is in this context 
that a massive clean-up took place in 2006 
and 2007 to close or freeze dormant and 
suspicious CSD accounts.
Mainly in Chapter VII, Articles 155-168. 14 
Citation; see “Appendix 2: Key aspects of the Securities  15 
Regulatory System” in CSRC, Annual Report 2008, p. 50.
Since 1993, securities are completely dematerialised in China and  16 
held/transferred only via book-entries on securities accounts.13
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AND PROCESSES
2.1  CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT INSTITUTIONS
In mainland China there are two CSDs, 
the China Securities Depository and Clearing Co. 
(SD&C), which serves the two stock exchanges 
and also acts as a CCP for them, and the 
China Government Securities Depository 
Trust & Clearing Co. (CDC), which serves the 
interbank bond market. Bond settlement of the 
two mainland stock exchanges is also handled 
by the SD&C.
2.1.1 THE CHINA SECURITIES DEPOSITORY 
AND CLEARING CO. (SD&C)
Following the approval of the CSRC and 
agreement of the State Council, the China 
Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation 
(Chinese abbreviation: Zhongzhengdeng  中证登)
was founded on 30 March 2001 in accordance 
with the Securities Law and the Company Law. 
In particular, its establishment fulﬁ  lled 
the requirements of the Securities Law for 
centralising the operations for registering and 
settling securities. The SD&C’s headquarters 
are located in Beijing. Its two branches in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen were established in 
September 2001, and as of 1 October 2001 
they took over the complete registration and 
settlement business of the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges, which are also the 
shareholders of the SD&C, each holding 50% 
of its registered capital of RMB 1.2 billion. 
The supervisory authority of the SD&C is 
the CSRC.
In line with the relevant stipulations of the 
Securities Law and the Measures, the main 
functions of the SD&C include (hereafter key 
concepts in brackets and italics):
Management of   •  securities and settlement 
accounts (zhanghu guanli 账户管理)
Depository   • ( cunguan 存管) and transfer of 
ownership of securities
Registration   • ( dengji  登记) of securities 
holders and of their rights and interests
Clearing   • ( qingsuan  清算) and settlement 
(jiaoshou 交收 or jiesuan 结算) as well as 
management of cash and securities
Distribution of securities rights and interests    •
on behalf of issuers (corporate actions)
In 2008, the SD&C settled almost 4 billion 
transactions with a value of RMB 64 trillion 
(€6.66 trillion). Compared with 2007, this meant 
a decrease of 21.4% in terms of volume and 
34.6% in terms of value, mainly due to the 
decreased trading activity caused by the crisis. 
However, in 2009 settlement volumes quickly 
picked up again, resulting in a total for the whole 
year 2009 of almost 7 billion transactions 
worth RMB 129.6 trillion (€13.5 trillion)17. 
This last ﬁ  gure is still relatively low compared 
with turnovers in the US and Europe – 
for example, in 2008 the Depository Trust & 
Clearing Corporation (DTCC) settled 
€1,337 trillion (USD 1,880 trillion), and 
Euroclear approximately €569 trillion worth of 
transactions18 – but the Chinese growth potential 
is clear. In 2008, the SD&C achieved a total 
settlement efﬁ  ciency of 97%.19 From a technical 
perspective, there is no system integration 
between the SD&C Shanghai and the SD&C 
Shenzhen, so that the two branches act de facto 
as separate CSDs for the two stock exchanges.
2.1.2 THE CHINA GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CO. (CDC) 
In order to establish a safe, efﬁ  cient and low-cost 
bond market, the PBC and the MOF jointly 
proposed to establish the China Government 
Securities Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (abbreviated as Zhongzhaideng 
See SD&C,  17  Yewu tongji yuebao 业务统计月报 (Monthly business 
statistics report), December 2009, p. 2, retrieved on 26 January 
2010 from http://www.chinaclear.cn/main/03/0304/0304_1.html
See DTCC,  18  Annual Report 2008, p. 4, and Euroclear, Annual 
Report 2008, p. 9. To make the ﬁ   gures fully comparable, 
a considerable part of the CDC business would need to be added 
to the SD&C ﬁ  gures, but the value gap would still be huge.
CSRC,  19  Annual Report 2008, p. 77.14
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中债登). With their approval and the agreement 
of the State Council, the CDC was set up 
in December 1996 as the designated central 
institution to provide bond depository, custody 
(tuoguan  托管) and settlement ( jiesuan) 
services for China’s interbank bond market. 
The CDC is based in Beijing. It is completely 
state-owned and has a registered capital of 
RMB 480 million (€50 billion). Its supervisory 
authority is the PBC.
The CDC is a non-bank ﬁ  nancial  institution, 
which offers issuance, registration, custody, 
settlement, and principal redemption/interest 
payment agency services for government bonds, 
ﬁ  nancial debentures, corporate bonds, and other 
ﬁ   xed-income securities, as well as for bond 
funds and money market funds. It provides 
ﬁ   rst-tier custody services for the whole bond 
market, with the SD&C acting as sub-custodian 
for the exchange bond market, and the four big 
commercial banks acting as sub-custodians for 
the bank counter market.
In 2008, the CDC settled more than 
345,000 transactions with a value of RMB 
104.6 trillion (USD 15.3 trillion). Compared 
with 2007, this was an increase of 62% in terms 
of volume and 66% in terms of value, meaning 
that the growth of previous years continued 
despite the crisis, which according to the CDC 
had “almost no impact” on transaction volumes 
in the interbank bond market. The value of 
transactions settled from January until October 
2009 amounted to RMB 105 trillion.
2.2  CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT PROCESSES
Based on information provided by the PBC and 
the two Chinese CSDs, the main features of the 
post-trading processes in the SD&C and the 
CDC are described below.20
2.2.1 SD&C
BOOK-KEEPING PRINCIPLES
Predominantly a direct holding ( zhijie chiyou 
直接持有) method is applied with book entries 
for A share investors being made directly on 
end-investor accounts held in the SD&C. 
Only for the much smaller B share segment, an 
indirect holding (jianjie chiyou 间接持有) method 
with nominee accounts is used. This difference 
stems from the fact that overseas markets have 
other jurisdictions and shareholder systems than 
China. Segregated end-investor accounts are also 
maintained in the booking systems of the securities 
companies, and at the end-of-day (18:00), 
end-investor positions are reconciled between the 
SD&C and the securities companies.
CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT PRINCIPLES
The SD&C is responsible for the clearing and 
settlement of stocks and bonds traded on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. After 
completion of the trades, they are sent from 
the stock exchange to the respective SD&C 
branch, which applies the following clearing 
and settlement principles:
Tiered settlement   • ( fenji jiesuan 分级结算) :
While the SD&C is responsible for the 
settlement with securities companies 
or direct investors (ﬁ   rst tier), securities 
companies are responsible for the settlement 
with their clients (second tier).
Multilateral netting   • ( duobian jing’e jiesuan 
多边净额结算 or duobian gacha 多边轧差): 
For the majority of trades between the securities 
companies/direct investors, their resulting 
obligations to deliver securities or cash are 
netted by the SD&C on a multilateral basis.
Central counterparty   • ( zhongyang duishou 
中央对手  or  gongtong duishoufang 
共同对手方): The SD&C acts as a central 
counterparty (CCP) to the counterparties of a 
securities transaction. If a trading counterparty 
defaults on its obligation in securities or cash, 
Although Francis Braeckevelt, “Clearing, settlement and  20 
depository issues” in: Bank for International Settlements, 
Asian bond markets: issues and prospects (BIS Papers No. 30), 
November 2006, pp. 284-332, contains useful information on 
post-trading in China, he only covers the SD&C, not the CDC 
and the interbank bond market. Some basic information on 
both the SD&C and the CDC is included in EMEAP Working 
Group on Payment and Settlement Systems, Payment Systems in 
EMEAP Economies, July 2002, pp. 78-85.15
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the SD&C fulﬁ  ls the obligation on behalf of 
the defaulter.
Settlement reserve fund   • ( jiesuan beifujin 
结算备付金): In order to contain settlement 
risk ( jiesuan fengxian 结算风险), each 
securities company/direct investor must 
maintain a daily minimum balance in its 
cash settlement account as a “settlement 
reserve fund”, the amount of which is set by 
the SD&C.
SETTLEMENT ACCOUNTS
The SD&C is responsible for a standardised 
management of securities accounts (zhengquan 
zhanghu 证券账户), including the opening of 
securities accounts, and the deposit and transfer 
of securities. Each settlement participant 
(jiesuan canyuren 结算参与人), which can be a 
securities company or direct investor, needs to 
open securities accounts with the SD&C to deposit 
the securities of its clients or its own securities. 
To perform settlement, the SD&C maintains – 
for its deliveries or receipts as a CCP – 
a Centralised Securities Settlement Account, 
and each settlement participant must – under its 
own name and legal person – open a Securities 
Settlement Account with the SD&C for 
securities deliveries or receipts between itself 
and the SD&C.
With regard to cash accounts ( zijin zhanghu 
资金账户), the situation is as follows: 
each settlement participant must open a dedicated 
cash account with one of the settlement banks 
(jiesuan yinhang 结算银行) 21 as well as a Fund 
Settlement Account with the SD&C to deposit its 
minimum settlement reserve fund and to settle 
the cash positions between itself and the SD&C. 
In addition, the SD&C has opened a deposit 
account with each settlement bank for receiving 
and transferring the cash positions resulting from 
securities settlement. For cash settlements in its 
role as a CCP, the SD&C maintains in addition a 
Centralised Fund Settlement Account, from or to 
which the net cash proceeds are booked to or 
from the Fund Settlement Accounts of the 
settlement participants.
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
The  ﬁ   rst-tier settlement between the SD&C 
and the securities companies/direct investors 
consists of two phases, the clearing (qingsuan) 
and the settlement (jiaoshou) phase.
Clearing phase   • : At the end of the trading 
day T, the SD&C calculates the net amounts 
of cash and securities receivable and payable 
by each settlement participant according 
to the multilateral netting principle, and 
informs them accordingly before midnight 
(24:00) on T.
Settlement phase   • : At the end of day 
T (18:00), the SD&C completes in its role as 
a CCP the settlement of securities delivery 
obligations between itself and the settlement 
participants by directly debiting or crediting 
their Securities Settlement Accounts, with 
the securities being transferred on a ﬁ  nal and 
irrevocable basis.
For the majority of transactions (A shares and 
bonds), the net fund movement occurs one 
day after the  ﬁ   nal movement of securities: 
On T+1, each settlement participant with a 
payment obligation transfers the funds from its 
dedicated cash account to the deposit account 
of the SD&C with that settlement bank. 
At 16:00 on T+1, the SD&C completes the fund 
settlement by directly debiting or crediting the 
Fund Settlement Accounts of the settlement 
participants.
For B shares, cash is paid on a net basis on T+3. 
The SD&C explained this longer settlement 
cycle by the different time zones involved for B 
share investors (e.g. Europe and the US).
Since DVP settlement requires that the 
movement of securities and the movement of 
Currently there are 16  21  settlement banks designated by the 
SD&C, which are all commercial banks. Their systems are all 
directly linked with the SD&C. In October 2009, the SD&C 
had approximately 200 different settlement participants, 
which can freely choose one of the settlement banks according to 
their needs and risk preferences.16
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funds depend on each other (i.e. securities are 
delivered only if payment occurs), this means 
that no DVP settlement exists for transactions in 
A shares, B shares and bonds, which form the 
majority of the SD&C settlement business.
Only for exchange-traded funds (ETFs), options 
and a few other products, the SD&C currently 
applies a DVP settlement mechanism with 
cash and securities settling simultaneously 
and irrevocably on T+1. The DVP model is an 
interfaced model, which is also applied by the 
CDC (see Section 2.3 below).
SETTLEMENT RISK MITIGATION
Although DVP settlement is currently applied 
only for a minority of transactions, “risks 
are completely controlled”, according to the 
SD&C. The main risk mitigation instrument 
is the settlement reserve fund. In addition, 
brokers (i.e. securities companies) check the 
availability of securities/cash with the appointed 
custodian/settlement bank before executing 
trades, and trades are rejected in the event 
of insufﬁ  cient holdings. Once executed, trades 
are binding on the brokers. There are no 
buy-in/sell-out rules. In case of an overdraft, 
the SD&C imposes interest penalties based on 
the amount of the overdraft and holds securities 
as collateral.22 Auto-collateralisation currently 
does not exist within the SD&C.
Since 2005, short-selling ( maikong  卖空) 
is no longer prohibited by law, but with two 
exceptions, its use is still rather limited: To help 
primary dealers and market-makers respectively, 
short-selling was introduced in 2008 on the 
exchange bond market in Shanghai, and in 2007 
on the interbank bond market. Although strictly 
speaking not prohibited, securities  ﬁ  nancing 
(rongzi rongquan 融资融券) was not practiced 
until recently, when it started to get promoted 
and was formally introduced in the SD&C with 
effect from 31 March 2010.
In addition to the above, the SD&C has 
established a settlement guarantee fund (jiesuan 
hubaojin 结算互保金), which is used to cover 
losses incurred by settlement participants that do 
not meet their delivery or payment obligations. 
The settlement guarantee fund is ﬁ  nanced by the 
settlement participants according to a formula set 
by the SD&C. Furthermore, in accordance with a 
regulation of the Ministry of Finance and the 
CSRC,23 the SD&C administers a securities 
settlement risk fund ( zhengquan jiesuan 
fengxian jijin 证券结算风险基金), which is used 
to cover any unavoidable losses for the CSD 
resulting from settlement failures, technical 
incidents or operational errors. This fund is 
initially funded with 20% of the net revenue/
proﬁ  t of the CSD and further funded according to 
a certain ratio of the overall equity, fund, bond 
and repo trading volume of the settlement 
participants. The upper limit of the fund is 
currently set at RMB 3 billion (€312 million).
2.2.2 CDC
Currently no clearing layer exists and only gross 
settlement (quan’e jiesuan 全额结算) is used. 
According to the CDC, the design of a netting 
functionality has already been ﬁ  nalised, and as 
soon as it receives the necessary approval by the 
PBC, net settlement (jing’e jiesuan 净额结算) 
might be introduced. However, after the recent 
foundation of the Shanghai Clearing House 
(see Section 3.2.3 below), it is more likely that 
this new institution will in the future act as 
a CCP, rather than the CDC performing that 
function itself as the SD&C does.
BOOK-KEEPING AND SETTLEMENT PRINCIPLES
Predominantly the direct holding method (98%) 
is applied, with end-investor securities accounts 
for the interbank bond market being held directly 
in the CDC. For the exchange bond market and 
the bank counter market, the indirect holding 
method (2%) is used, with the sub-custodians, 
the SD&C and the four big commercial banks 
holding the securities in the books of the CDC 
on behalf of the beneﬁ  cial owners.
To carry out its functions, the CDC has set up 
a centralised bond business system, consisting 
See Braeckevelt (2006), p. 324. 22 
The  23  Notice on the Promulgation of the Measures for the 
Administration of the Securities Settlement Risk Fund (CSRC 
Notice No. (2006) 65).17
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of several components. Its core component, the 
Centralised Bond Book-Entry System, is linked 
with the automated Interbank Trading System 
of the National Interbank Funding Center in 
order to support a straight-through processing 
(zhitong chuli 直通处理) of the trading and 
settlement layers of the interbank bond market. 
The main trading types are spot, repo (huigou 
回购) and forward trades, the latter two having 
been introduced in the interbank bond market 
in 2004 and 2005 respectively. The following 
settlement principles are applied:
Same-day conﬁ  rmation   • ( tongri queren 
同日确认): Market participants have to 
conﬁ  rm the details of the trade on the same 
day. If a trade is concluded via the Interbank 
Trading System, the CDC automatically 
receives the details of the trade and sends 
them to the counterparties for conﬁ  rmation. 
If a trade is concluded outside the Interbank 
Trading System, one counterparty has to 
send the trade details to the CDC, which 
forwards them to the other counterparty for 
conﬁ  rmation.
    After matching the settlement instructions 
of the two counterparties, a settlement 
contract is formed (binding matching), and 
the CDC proceeds with the settlement of the 
instructions.
Settlement cycle   • ( jiesuan zhouqi 结算周期): 
The CDC provides settlement services to 
the participants in the interbank bond market 
according to the rolling settlement principle. 
The settlement cycle is T+0 for DVP settlement, 
and T+1 for the other settlement methods 
(in case of special needs of the participants).
The four settlement methods used by the CDC 
are as follows:
Delivery versus payment   •  (DVP – fukuan 
jiaoge 付款交割, quankuan duifu 券款兑付 
or huoyin duifu 货银对付): The movement 
of securities and the movement of funds are 
dependent on each other (delivery occurs 
only if payment occurs).
Payment after delivery   •  (PAD – jianquan 
fukuan  见券付款): The security buyer 
pays the funds only when he has “seen” 
(jian  见) the securities, i.e. when the 
securities movement has been completed.
Delivery after payment   •  (DAP – jiankuan 
fuquan  见款付券): The security seller 
delivers the securities only when he has 
“seen” (jian) the funds, i.e. when the funds 
movement has been completed.
Free of payment    • (FOP – chunquan guohu 
纯券过户): Securities are moved 
independently of or with no funds movement.
Today,  DVP, which was introduced in 2004 
(see Section 2.3 below), is by far the dominant 
settlement method. In 2008, the share of DVP 
settlement in total settlement in central bank 
money reached 95% in terms of value and 
89% in terms of volume. As explained below, 
the CDC applies an interfaced DVP model.
SETTLEMENT RISK MITIGATION
DVP settlement and trade as well as settlement 
matching (pipei 匹配 or peidui 配对) are used as 
the main risk mitigation methods. Once matched, 
trades are binding on the participants. In addition, 
the feature of auto-collateralisation ( zidong 
zhiya rongzi 自动质押融资) exists.
There are no buy-in/sell-out rules, and although 
securities lending and borrowing is planned for 
the future, the CDC has not yet implemented 
it. Short-selling is generally considered as 
being too risky; only market-makers in the 
interbank bond market are allowed to short-sell 
(since 2007).
2.3  THE INTRODUCTION OF DVP SETTLEMENT
To better understand the different levels of 
adoption of DVP settlement, which plays a 
majority role in the CDC, but only a minority 
role in the SD&C, it is worth looking at the 
history of the introduction of DVP settlement in 
China. This policy measure also reveals some 
elements that are characteristic of the Chinese 18
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reform path in general, namely experimentation 
and gradual implementation,24 as well as internal 
and external justiﬁ   cation. Further aspects of 
policy-making in China from the perspective of 
market infrastructure reform will be explored 
in Part 3.
To enable DVP settlement in central bank 
money, in November 2004 the CDC linked its 
centralised bond business system with the RTGS 
(real-time gross settlement) system (HVPS) of 
the China National Clearing Center (CNCC; 
see Section 3.2.1 below), and started to provide 
DVP settlement for commercial banks. In the 
following three years, which can be regarded as 
the experimentation phase, both the total CDC 
settlement value and the value of DVP settlement 
rose sharply, as shown in Chart 3, increasing the 
DVP ratio to almost 50% in 2007.
Following an overall assessment and encouraged 
by the success of DVP, the PBC had already at 
the beginning of 2007 approved a scheme to 
extend DVP settlement to non-bank institutions, 
with the aim to “upgrade their settlement 
credit rating” and to further reduce settlement 
risk.25 In August 2008, after establishing the 
necessary correspondent banking arrangements 
(see below), the CDC began to provide DVP 
settlement services also to non-bank institution 
members. Since then, DVP settlement has 
been applied to all types of participants in the 
interbank bond market, greatly increasing its 
post-trading safety and efﬁ  ciency.  According 
to the PBC, in 2009 the value of transactions 
settled by the CDC in DVP mode amounted to 
RMB 132.7 trillion (€13.8 trillion), which was 
equivalent to a DVP ratio of 82.4% in terms of 
value (see Chart 3).26
As far as the settlement accounts are concerned, 
the securities accounts are held on the CDC 
platform and the cash accounts are held in the 
RTGS system (HVPS), so the applied DVP 
model is an interfaced model ( jiekou moshi 
接口模式). To be able to participate in the DVP 
settlement, interbank bond market participants 
need to open bond custody accounts with the 
CDC and fund settlement accounts in the HVPS. 
Non-bank institutions, which are not eligible to 
open fund settlement accounts in the HVPS, 
need to entrust a commercial bank or the CDC to 
perform the funds movement on their behalf. To 
be able to act as a correspondent bank for a non-
HVPS participant, the CDC opens a special fund 
settlement account in the HVPS, under which 
a sub-account will be opened for the non-HVPS 
participant.
There are three possible scenarios to achieve 
DVP settlement: DVP settlement between 
commercial banks (HVPS participants); DVP 
settlement involving non-bank institutions, which 
entrust a commercial bank to complete the funds 
transfer; and DVP settlement involving non-bank 
institutions, which entrust the CDC to complete 
the funds transfer. In all three scenarios, the basic 
The Chinese image to describe this gradual approach is “crossing the  24 
river by feeling the stones” (mozhe shitou guohe 摸着石头过河).
Payment and Settlement Department of the People’s Bank of  25 
China (PSD), China Payment System Development Report 2007, 
Beijing, March 2009, p. 69.
Zhongguo renmin yinhang zhifu jiesuan si  26  中国人民银行支付
结算司 (Payment and Settlement Department of the People’s 
Bank of China), Zhongguo zhifu tixi fazhan baogao 中国支付
体系发展报告 (China Payment System Development Report) 
2009, May 2010, pp. 56-57.
Chart 3 Development of CDC settlement 






















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
total settlement value
value of DVP settlement
Source: Zhongguo renmin yinhang zhifu jiesuan si (2010), 
ﬁ  gure 43, p. 57, based on CDC data.19
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settlement process is as follows: After receiving 
the settlement instructions from the trading 
counterparties, the CDC conﬁ  rms whether the 
bond balance of the seller is sufﬁ  cient. If that 
is the case, it blocks the corresponding bond 
amount and initiates a payment instruction to 
the HVPS. After conﬁ  rmation from the HVPS 
that the funds transfer has been successful, the 
CDC completes the bond delivery immediately. 
The securities movement thus depends on the 
funds movement.
To ensure a smooth cooperation between the 
CDC and the CNCC in the provision of DVP 
settlement services, the two institutions have 
established a joint operational mechanism, 
which keeps operational responsibilities for 
the settlement system and the payment system 
separate, but requires that any measures, upgrades 
or updates of one system do not reduce the safety 
and stability of the other system. For coordination 
and communication purposes, the CDC and the 
CNCC have established a contact group.
Both in the revised version of the Securities Law 
that came into effect on 1 January 2006, and in 
the Measures (see Section 1.3.2 above), DVP is 
referred to as the “basic settlement principle” 
of securities markets in China. However, while 
it has been implemented in the interbank bond 
market, the stock exchange market still lags 
behind in the implementation of DVP.
Although so far the SD&C uses DVP only for a 
few products like ETFs and options, it has 
extensively studied DVP mechanisms in other 
countries (such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Germany 
and the United States) and discussed the need to 
fully adopt DVP on the mainland. The conclusion 
is that China should do so, and the justiﬁ  cations 
given are both internal and external. Internally, 
it is mainly argued that “in case the funds on 
T+1 are not sufﬁ  cient, the SD&C is facing a 
considerable amount of principal risk”. 
Externally, DVP is justiﬁ  ed for example with 
the G30/ISSA recommendations, and by calling 
it a “necessity of the internationalisation of 
markets” and a precondition for reaping the 
“beneﬁ  ts of globalisation”.27
The experience already gained with DVP 
settlement by the SD&C is regarded as a ﬁ  rst 
step towards fully achieving DVP in the stock 
exchange market. So the concept of gradual 
implementation is not only followed by the 
CDC, but also by the SD&C, which has already 
made preparations for the full adoption of DVP 
by analysing and collating the required system 
changes and the necessary updates to their rules, 
guidelines and other types of legal documentation. 
In April 2010 the CSRC approved new clearing 
and settlement rules, which will allow the 
SD&C to fully implement DVP, probably by 
the end of 2010. Although settlement still takes 
place in commercial bank money, the DVP 
ratio is expected to rise above 90%. In addition, 
the SD&C is discussing with the PBC the possibility 
of creating a link with the HVPS to enable DVP 
settlement in central bank money in the future.
The discrepancy to date between the levels 
of DVP implementation in the CDC and the 
SD&C might be linked to the fact that the PBC 
is in control of both the central bank accounts 
(via the CNCC) and the securities accounts 
(via the CDC), which are required to achieve 
DVP in central bank money, whereas the SD&C 
only controls the securities accounts. It could 
thus be argued that due to its operational role the 
PBC has an institutional advantage compared 
with the CSRC, which oversees the SD&C.
2.4  LINKAGES AND INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION
Domestically, a settlement link between the two 
CSDs has existed since 2004/2005 to enable the 
transfer of bonds across markets 28. While at the 
beginning the link was completely manual, 
it was replaced in 2007 by an electronic link, 
which however still requires some manual 
SD&C,  27  Woguo shixing DVP jiesuan zhidu de biyaoxing kexingxing 
fenxi 我国实行DVP结算制度的必要性可行性分析 (Analysis of 
the necessity and feasiblity of practising DVP settlement in our 
country), undated paper, p. 4, see: http://www.chinaclear.cn/main/
07/0701/070114/1225679479589.pdf.
The contractual basis is the  28  Service Agreement on Cross Market 
Custody Transfer of Treasury Bonds between the CDC and 
the SD&C, which was renewed in March 2008. See SD&C, 
Annual Report 2008, p. 70.20
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intervention at the end of the day. The interbank 
bond market (CDC) and the exchange bond 
market (SD&C) have common participants with 
holdings of the same issue in both markets. 
This and the fact that the repo mechanisms 29 and 
rates of the two markets differ, which causes 
arbitrage, has caused a hot debate in the past on 
whether or not to create a fully integrated bond 
market. Although many advocate such an 
integration, it is unlikely to happen as long as 
the current regulatory structure – with the PBC 
being in charge of the interbank segment and 
the CSRC in charge of the exchange segment – 
remains unchanged. So the immediate future 
will probably only see the improvement of the 
CDC-SD&C link and potentially an additional 
trading link together with a harmonisation of 
market practices to accommodate the view of 
the State Council that the interbank bond market 
and the exchange bond market should be fully 
linked and connected with each other.
Internationally, the CDC has maintained 
electronic links with the Central Moneymarkets 
Unit (CMU) 30 of the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority since 2004 for settlement in HKD, 
and with Clearstream Banking Luxembourg 
(CBL) since 2007 for settlement in USD and 
EUR. However, according to the CDC, up to 
now these links have not or almost not been 
used due to a lack of business.
Both the CDC and the SD&C have over the 
last couple of years signed memoranda of 
understanding (MoUs) with the major CSDs 
in the world, including JASDEC, DTCC, 
Clearstream and Euroclear, to foster information 
exchange and cooperation on issues or projects 
of common interest.
In terms of international standards, the 
two Chinese CSDs seem to be abreast of global 
developments. Examples include the adoption 
of ISIN codes 31 and efforts to introduce 
CUSIP codes by the SD&C, the scope of DVP 
settlement in the CDC, and the planned use 
of ISO 20022 for the next RTGS generation 
(HVPS; see Section 3.2.1 below).
As far as the PBC is concerned, it not only 
maintains relations with the major central banks 
in the world (including the European Central 
Bank), but also has been publishing since 2006 
an annual China Payment System Development 
Report in Chinese and English, which is explicitly 
intended to “help increase the knowledge of 
the international community on the progress in 
payment system development” 32. In July 2009 
the PBC became an ofﬁ   cial member of the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(CPSS). It can be expected that this membership 
will deepen the internationalisation of the 
PBC in this ﬁ  eld, as the CPSS is an important 
standard-setting body and international forum 
for payment and securities settlement systems. 
Another example of international cooperation 
is the IMF/World Bank Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) for China,33 which 
is planned for 2010 and will be coordinated, 
although also involving other ministries and 
government agencies, personally by ZHOU 
Xiaochuan 周小川, the Governor of the PBC.
For example, on the exchange bond market, the SD&C manages  29 
the collateral in a kind of tri-party repo, whereas such repos do 
not exist on the interbank bond market.
The CMU (www.cmu.org.hk) is a CSD for debt instruments and  30 
is operated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The link 
between the CDC and the CMU is a one-way link so that CDC 
participants that are authorised to invest in foreign debt securities 
may settle and hold Hong Kong and foreign debt securities 
through the CDC account with the CMU.
5,134 ﬁ  nancial instruments were assigned an ISIN by the end  31 
of October 2008, including A, B and H shares, Treasury bonds, 
corporate bonds, futures, warrants and indices. See SD&C, 
Annual Report 2008, p. 57.
PSD,  32  China Payment System Development Report 2006, Beijing, 
September 2007, Foreword by Deputy Governor SU Ning.
In the concluding statement of his visit to Beijing on  33 
17 November 2009, the IMF Managing Director Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn highlighted “China’s commendable commitment 
to participate in the IMF’s FSAP” and said that “joint work 
to undertake that assessment is already well underway”: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09411.htm, 
retrieved on 8 February 2010.21
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3.1  IMPORTANCE AND OBJECTIVES
From a Chinese perspective, the policies and 
projects in the ﬁ  eld of clearing and settlement are 
an important and integral part of the development 
of the payment system, which is understood as 
not only including “traditional banking payment 
and settlement, but also registration, custody, 
clearing and settlement of such ﬁ  nancial market 
products as bonds, stocks and foreign exchange, 
as well as specialized clearing of bankcards”.34 
Together with the payment system as a whole, 
securities clearing and settlement is regarded as 
being of strategic importance and therefore 
ranges relatively high on the reform agenda of 
the Chinese government. This can be seen from 
the intensity of the efforts in recent years 
(see Section 3.2.1 below), as well as from the 
attention and support payment system 
development receives from political leaders at 
the highest level. The visit by President HU Jintao 
胡锦涛 to the Shanghai headquarters of China 
UnionPay on 16 January 2010 may serve as an 
example in this respect. During his visit, Hu Jintao 
was  inter alia accompanied by Vice-Premier 
WANG Qishan 王岐山, the top economic
policy-maker in charge of state ﬁ  nances  and 
ﬁ   nancial sector reforms, and PBC Governor 
Zhou Xiaochuan.35 According to the PBC, 
the immediate objective of payment system 
development is to contribute to the “smooth 
transmission of monetary policy, ﬁ  nancial 
stability and the improvement of ﬁ  nancial 
services”, with the “promotion of China’s 
ﬁ  nancial market reform as well as economic and 
social development” being the ultimate overall 
objective. The longer-term plans are both 
ambitious and conﬁ  dent, since the PBC aims at 
“developing the Chinese payment system into the 
most advanced, convenient and distinctive 
payment system in the world”.36
3.2  THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
the People’s Bank of China, promulgated in 
1995 and revised in 2003, stipulates that one 
of the functions of the PBC is to “ensure the 
normal operation of payment and settlement 
systems” (Article 4). Furthermore, the PBC 
“shall formulate rules on payment and settlement 
together with the banking regulatory authority 
under the State Council [i.e. the CBRC]” 
(Article 27). The policy objectives of the PBC 
in the ﬁ  eld of payment and settlement systems 
are safety and efﬁ  ciency, as well as consumer 
protection and public conﬁ  dence in the systems. 
The key tasks of the PBC in this ﬁ  eld include 
the responsibility to:
ensure the safe and efﬁ   cient operation of    •
systemically important payment systems;
provide interbank payment, clearing and    •
settlement services; and
oversee payment and settlement systems,    •
payment instruments, as well as payment 
institutions.
For the performance of its tasks, the PBC 
takes an operational role, carries out oversight 
activities and promotes payment and settlement 
system reform by acting as a catalyst. In the 
PBC terminology, these three roles are referred 
to as “organising (zuzhi  组织), overseeing 
(jianguan 监管) and driving (tuidong 推动) the 
payment system”.
3.2.1 OPERATIONAL ROLE
In the ﬁ  eld of securities market infrastructure, 
the PBC has no operational role, but acts, in 
cooperation with the CSRC, as an overseer 
of securities settlement systems and seeks to 
promote the establishment and improvement of 
clearing and settlement service networks.
PSD,  34  China Payment System Development Report 2008, Beijing, 
October 2009, Preface by Mr OUYANG Weimin, ﬁ  rst page.
For more information on the visit, see  35 http://en.chinaunionpay.
com/news/newsroom/ﬁ  le_6659614.html. Founded in March 2002, 
China UnionPay is an association for China’s banking card 
industry, operating under the approval of the PBC.
See PSD,  36  China Payment System Development Report 2008, 
Beijing, October 2009, p. 63.22
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In the ﬁ   eld of payment systems, the PBC 
owns and operates, via its National Clearing 
Center (in Chinese Qingsuan zongzhongxin 
清算总中心), the China National Advanced 
Payment System (CNAPS). The China National 
Clearing Center (CNCC) was established in 
May 1990 as a non-proﬁ  t, separate organisation 
under the administration of the PBC, which 
builds, operates and maintains payment system 
infrastructure for the central bank. The CNCC 
is thus a kind of operational arm of the PBC 
similar to the New York Fed. The system 
architecture for CNAPS consists of a National 
Processing Center in Beijing with a local and 
a remote 37 backup center, as well as of 32 City 
Clearing Processing Centers spread all over the 
country.
The two main CNAPS components, the High 
Value Payment System (HVPS), which is 
an RTGS system, and the Bulk Electronic 
Payment System (BEPS), were launched 
in June 2005 and 2006 respectively. Other 
CNAPS components include the nationwide 
Cheque Image System (CIS), the China 
Domestic Foreign Currency Payment System 
(CDFCPS) 38 and the Electronic Commercial 
Draft System (ECDS), which went live in 2007, 
2008 and 2009 respectively, the last one still 
being in a pilot phase. Overall, the CNAPS has 
almost 1,000 direct participants and more than 
80,000 indirect participants. In 2009 the HVPS, 
which is crucial in the context of securities 
settlement (see Section 2.3 above), processed 
a daily average of 1,000,000 payments with a 
value of almost RMB 3 trillion (€312.5 billion). 
This can be compared with the Fedwire 
and TARGET2 systems, which processed 
498,000 payments worth USD 2.5 trillion 
(€1.78 trillion) and 348,000 payments worth 
€2.1 trillion respectively on average per day in 
the second quarter of 2009.
This speed of implementation – not only has a 
major new system been rolled out once every 
year over the last ﬁ  ve years, the PBC has since 
2007 been planning the second-generation 
HVPS targeted to go live in 2010/2011 – is 
impressive, even if one considers that China 
started from a lower level, and proves that 
payment system development is taken very 
seriously by the PBC. According to the CNCC, 
the next-generation HVPS will include a 
centralised access point for commercial banks, 
more  ﬂ   exible liquidity management tools, a 
higher security and efﬁ  ciency level, and the use 
of ISO 20022 messaging standards.
3.2.2 OVERSIGHT ROLE
The PBC formulated its oversight concept for 
the  ﬁ   rst time publicly in its Payment System 
Development Report 2006 as the “action taken 
by the central bank to supervise and regulate the 
payment system, payment instruments and 
payment institutions through a mix of economic, 
legal and administrative measures in order to 
safeguard the safety and stability of the payment 
system and public trust in such system”.39 As 
mentioned above, payment system is understood in 
the broad sense of including securities clearing and 
settlement arrangements, and in 2007 the PBC 
assessed for the ﬁ  rst time the CDC against the 
CPSS-IOSCO recommendations, concluding that 
“some indicators attained or even exceeded the 
recommendations and ranked among the top levels 
worldwide, while others kept a great distance from 
the recommendations”.40 Shortcomings mainly 
concerned Recommendations 5 (securities 
lending), 7 (DVP scope) and 9 (risk controls) 
and partly resulted in concrete measures, like 
the further expansion of DVP settlement 
(see Section 2.3 above) and the planned 
introduction of net settlement in the CDC 
(see Section 2.2.2 above). These examples show 
that the oversight and catalyst roles partly overlap 
and that activities under the former role may result 
in innovations intended under the latter role.
According to the CNCC, the non-local disaster recovery center is  37 
more than 1,000 kms away.
Since its launch in 2008, the PBC has established a cooperative  38 
oversight mechanism for the CDFCPS with the concerned central 
banks (including the European Central Bank for the euro), which 
foresees regular information-sharing.
PSD,  39  China Payment System Development Report 2006, p. 3.
PSD,  40  China Payment System Development Report 2007, p. 94.23
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3.2.3 CATALYST ROLE
Apart from operating and overseeing the 
payment system, the third role of the PBC is 
to promote innovation, or as it is sometimes 
euphemistically put, to “encourage innovation” 
(cujin chuangxin 促进创新) within the payment
system. Two prominent examples that 
this encouragement might go as far as 
institution-building are China UnionPay (CUP) 
and the recently established Shanghai Clearing 
House (SCH).
They also reveal a tendency in PBC policy-
making, namely that of putting PBC managers 
in charge of key infrastructures.41 The ﬁ  rst, 
China UnionPay (Zhongguo yinlian 中国银联),
which has been instrumental in establishing 
the CUP card both domestically and 
internationally,42 has since its foundation 
in 2002 been strongly promoted by the PBC, 
and its President is the former Director General 
of the Payment and Settlement Department 
of the PBC (PSD), Mr XU Luode 许罗德. 
The second, the Shanghai Clearing House 
(Shanghai qingsuansuo 上海清算所), which 
was founded on 28 November 2009 with the 
approval of the MOF and the PBC, will be 
headed by the former Deputy Director General 
of the PSD, Mr XU Zhen 许臻, as Chairman 
and General Manager. Although it has not yet 
started operations and its exact business scope 
is yet to be deﬁ  ned, it is likely that the SCH will 
serve the interbank foreign exchange market 
and the interbank bond market regulated by 
the PBC. This is suggested by its ofﬁ  cial name 
“Interbank Market Clearing House Corporation”, 
and the fact that, according to a PBC press 
release, two of its four shareholders are the 
Shanghai-based China Foreign Exchange Trade 
System (CFETS) and the CDC.43 The opening 
ceremony of the SCH was hosted by 
Mr SU Ning 苏宁, the PBC Deputy Governor 
in charge of payment and settlement issues, 
and attended by Governor Zhou Xiaochuan and 
Shanghai Mayor HAN Zheng 韩正, who both 
delivered speeches. The presence of its two 
highest policy-makers in the ﬁ  eld of clearing 
and settlement (Zhou and Su) is a clear sign of 
the promotion of the SCH by the PBC.
3.3  CENTRAL AND LOCAL INTERESTS
The statements and references in the 
interventions of Governor Zhou and Mayor Han 
at the SCH opening ceremony offer some 
insight into the consensus-building between 
central and local interests, which according to 
the political scientists Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
is “central to the policy process” in China.44
In his speech, the Shanghai Mayor stressed that 
“setting up the Shanghai Clearing House is an 
important step taken to implement Document 
No. 19 of the State Council”, which was issued 
on 14 April 2009 to promote the establishment 
of Shanghai as an international ﬁ  nancial center 
and shipping hub.45 It is worth consulting this 
reference, since Document No. 19 lays out the 
objective to “basically establish by 2020 an 
international  ﬁ   nancial center commensurate 
with the strength of the Chinese economy and 
the international status of the Renminbi, and a 
multi-layered ﬁ  nancial market system, in which 
domestic and foreign investors participate 
together, which is internationalized to a 
relatively high degree and which completely 
provides for trading, price-setting and 
information functions”. Concrete measures to 
achieve this goal include “the further 
improvement of uniﬁ   ed and efﬁ  cient  modern 
Another example is the SD&C: Both its current Chairman  41 
Mr CHEN Yaoxian 陈耀先 and General Manager Ms JIN Ying 金颖 
have PBC backgrounds, although they also served the CSRC.
In terms of transaction volume, the CUP card is bigger than  42 
JCB, but behind VISA and MasterCard. By November 2009, 
CUP cards were accepted in 84 countries and regions. See http://
en.chinaunionpay.com/comInstr/aboutUs/file_2649016.html, 
retrieved on 6 February 2010.
See  43 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6400&ID=1448, 
retrieved on 6 February 2010.
Cf. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg,  44  Policy Making in 
China: Leaders, Structures and Processes, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1988, pp. 23-24.
State Council,  45  Guowuyuan guanyu tuijin Shanghai jiakuai 
fazhan xiandai fuwuye he xianjin zhizaoye jianshe guoji 
jinrong zhongxin he guoji hangyun zhongzin de yijian 国务院
关于推进上海加快发展现代服务业和先进制造业建设国
际金融中心和国际航运中心的意见  (Opinions of the State 
Council on promoting the rapid development of modern service 
industry and advanced manufacturing industry in Shanghai and 
making it an international ﬁ  nancial and shipping center), State 
Council Document No. 19, April 2009. See: http://www.gov.
cn/gongbao/content/2009/content_1303637.htm, retrieved on 
4 February 2010.24
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ﬁ   nancial support systems, such as those of 
registration, custody, clearing and settlement”, 
as Han Zheng recalled in his speech.
While Governor Zhou put the SCH in his 
speech more in the context of macro regulation 
and risk management, in particular after the 
outbreak of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, he did not fail 
to also mention the local objective of promoting 
Shanghai as a ﬁ  nancial center: “Setting up a 
specialized and independent clearing house is a 
major step taken by the PBC to implement 
instructions of the central government, tackle 
the impact of the international ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
deepen  ﬁ   nancial market reform, strengthen 
ﬁ   nancial infrastructure building and promote 
the construction of Shanghai as an international 
ﬁ  nancial center”.46
So despite the different emphasis in their 
speeches and differing underlying motivations, 
the prevailing consensus between the central 
level represented by Governor Zhou and the 
local level represented by Mayor Han becomes 
apparent. Without this general consensus, the 
decision to set up the SCH would not have 
been made, or only at a later stage after further 
bargaining between local and central levels.
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL  ASPECTS
The main institutions involved in market 
infrastructure-related policy-making are the 
PBC and the CSRC.
As far as the PBC is concerned, the main 
actor responsible for policy formulation and 
implementation is the Payment and Settlement 
Department (PSD) headed by Director General 
OUYANG Weimin 欧阳卫民 (see Picture 1).
As mentioned above, the PSD falls under 
the portfolio of Deputy Governor Su Ning 
(see Picture 2).
Although the PSD comprises six Divisions 
(General Affairs, Settlement Instrument 
Management, Payment System Management, 
The PBC press release of 28 November 2009 (see footnote 43)  46 
cites from the speeches of Mayor Han and Governor Zhou.
Picture 1 Director General OUYANG Weimin during an online chat on bank cards, 2 July 2009
Source: PBC (see http://www.pbc.gov.cn/detail.asp?col=100&ID=3283, retrieved on 12 February 2010).25
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Accounting System, Risk Oversight, and 
Information Analysis) and a Research Ofﬁ  ce, 
as at November 2009 its total headcount 
only amounted to 32 permanent full-time-
equivalent (FTE) staff members, plus 8 FTE 
temporary staff from regional ofﬁ  ces. On the 
one hand, with only 40 people the PSD seems 
quite efﬁ   cient, considering the multitude 
of issues under its responsibility and the 
respective headcount at comparable institutions 
(Federal Reserve, European Central Bank). 
On the other hand, it should not be forgotten 
that the CNCC (see Section 3.2.1 above) 
implements all operational policies and projects 
for the PBC, with the latter producing for 
example the high-level user requirements for a 
system and the former designing and building 
it. In November 2009, the CNCC had around 
200 permanent FTEs, plus 150-200 staff/
consultants with short-term contracts. The total 
staff of its 32 local Clearing Processing Centers 
currently amounts to another 200-300 FTEs.
The CDC is regulated by the Financial Market 
Department (FMD; see Section 1.3.1 above) 
of the PBC, which comprises seven Divisions 
(General Affairs, Bond Issuance, Bond Trading, 
Interbank Lending Market, Gold and Foreign 
Exchange Markets, Real Estate Financing, 
and Credit Policy Administration). The FMD 
is headed by Mr XIE Duo 谢多. In June 2010, 
its headcount amounted to 28 permanent FTEs, 
plus 10-12 FTE temporary staff from regional 
ofﬁ  ces.
As far as the CSRC is concerned, the main 
actor responsible for policy formulation and 
implementation is the Market Supervision 
Department, which is also in charge of regulating 
the SD&C. It is headed by Mr XIE Geng 谢庚 
and consists of ﬁ  ve Divisions (General Affairs, 
Trading Supervision, Settlement Supervision, 
Statistical Analysis, and Market Oversight) 
with a total headcount of 21 permanent FTEs in 
February 2010. 
Picture 2 PBC Deputy Governor SU Ning visiting the CNCC on 31 December 2009
Source: PBC (see http://www.pbc.gov.cn/detail.asp?col=100&ID=3475, retrieved on 12 February 2010).26
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Despite their remaining segmentation and 
access restrictions, Chinese securities markets 
have become more and more sophisticated and 
important for the economy over the last twenty 
years. This development is likely to continue in 
the future, and could even further accelerate if 
securities markets were to become completely 
integrated and open. However, for this to happen, 
an integrated regulatory structure replacing the 
currently split responsibilities of the PBC and 
the CSRC would probably be required as well.
Another important boost for the Chinese market 
to continue its growth and to gain global 
importance would be if Beijing were to introduce 
full capital account convertibility. It is hard to 
predict when exactly the RMB will become 
fully convertible, but some experts 47 believe that 
it could happen in the second half of the decade 
(2015-2020). This coincides with the above-
mentioned aim stated in State Council Document 
No. 19 to transform Shanghai by 2020 into an 
international  ﬁ   nancial center, which is 
“commensurate with the strength of the Chinese 
economy and the international status of the 
Renminbi”.
The post-trading infrastructure in China, which 
is predominantly a direct holding country, 
consists of two CSDs, the SD&C and the 
CDC. They are regulated by the CSRC and the 
PBC and serve the stock exchange market and 
the interbank bond market respectively. The 
SD&C also acts as a CCP, whereas a separate 
institution, the Shanghai Clearing House, has 
just been set up, which will probably act as a 
CCP for the interbank bond market.
In the light of the available information, the 
Chinese post-trading process can be regarded as 
technically safe and efﬁ  cient. The generalisation 
of DVP settlement currently under way will 
complete its modernisation. Once DVP is 
completely introduced in the stock exchange 
market, the inherent risks of its current method 
of settling securities on T+0 and cash on T+1 
will be eliminated, and the settlement reserve 
fund, which binds a lot of liquidity of the SD&C 
participants, will no longer be necessary.
The CSRC and the PBC are the key policy-
makers in the post-trading area with investor 
protection, safety and efﬁ  ciency being the main 
policy objectives. The policy framework and 
the policy-making process seem to be effective, 
whether it be in the area of operating, regulating 
or developing the market infrastructure. Of the 
two institutions, the leverage of the PBC seems 
to surpass that of the CSRC due to the operational 
role of the former, which may explain the 
different extent of DVP implementation in the 
interbank bond market and the stock exchange 
market.
The huge efforts and leadership attention in 
the ﬁ  eld of market infrastructure development 
in general indicate a high degree of consensus 
on its importance and the existence of a longer-
term strategy behind it. Comparing the payment 
and settlement system landscape today with the 
situation 5-6 years ago, and considering success 
stories like the CUP card, which managed to 
enter the league of VISA, MasterCard and 
JCB, and the CNCC (the operational arm of the 
PBC), the efﬁ  ciency and effectiveness of policy 
implementation in this ﬁ  eld becomes apparent.
Therefore, 
looking at what has already been achieved in    •
the ﬁ  eld of payment and settlement system 
development in China, 
Including Antony Leung, the former Financial Secretary of  47 
Hong Kong (see http://www.chinastakes.com/2009/4/rmb-
convertibility-expected-when-shanghai-becomes-a-global-
ﬁ  nancial-center-as-approved-by-the-state-council.html, retrieved 
on 22 June 2010). See also Friedrich Wu, Rongfang Pan, 
and Di Wang, “Renminbi’s potential to become a global currency”, 
China & World Economy, Vol. 18, No. 1, January-February 2010,
pp. 63-81, who review some of the literature on this topic. 
For a broader treatment of Chinese capital account convertibility 
issues see Lorenzo Cappiello and Gianluigi Ferrucci, 
“The sustainability of China’s exchange rate policy and 
capital account liberalisation”, ECB Occasional Paper No 82, 
March 2008.27
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AND OUTLOOK remembering the growth potential of    •
its securities markets, in particular if 
the government in Beijing opens them 
completely and moves to full capital account 
convertibility, and 
taking into account the effectiveness of the    •
policy process, which is not only visible in 
market infrastructure development, but also 
in the Chinese policy response to the crisis, 
it can be concluded that Chinese policy-
makers are well positioned to reach their goal 
of providing the domestic capital markets with 
advanced and efﬁ   cient operational support 
systems, especially those of clearing and 
settlement. This will include the envisaged 
aim of generalising DVP settlement. And it 
can be expected that globally the importance 
of securities transactions originating from or 
being processed in China will increase, as 
will the foreign interest in and knowledge of 
Chinese securities infrastructures and their 
characteristics.
Finally, the ﬁ   ndings of this study suggest 
that over the next ten years or so the Chinese 
mainland market is likely to become much more 
integrated with other major securities markets 
in Asia, Europe and the US, with cross-border 
linkages expanding, business volumes growing 
and standards, as well as market practices, 
converging more and more.28
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